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THE TESTIMONIAL COMPONENT OF THE
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Charles Gardner Geyh *
[T]he basic purposes that lie behind the privilege against self-in-
crimination do not relate to protecting the innocent from convic-
tion, but rather to preserving the integrity of a judicial system in
which even the guilty are not to be convicted unless the prosecu-
tion "shoulder the entire load."'
If a man has done wrong, he should be punished. But the evi-
dence against him should be produced, and evaluated by a proper
court in a fair trial. Neither torture nor an oath nor the threat of
punishment such as imprisonment for contempt should be used to
compel him to provide the evidence to accuse or to convict himself.
If his crime is a serious one, careful and often laborious police
work may be required to prove it by other evidence. Sometimes no
other evidence can be found. But for about three centuries in the
Anglo-American legal system we have accepted the standard that
even then we do not compel the accused to provide that evidence.2
These are two representative samples of the innumerable attempts by
courts and commentators to distill the essence of the right against compelled
self-incrimination guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution. They reflect a shared view of the spirit and meaning of the
fifth amendment right: that if the sovereign seeks to prosecute, convict and
punish a criminal suspect, it must do so on the strength of evidence gathered
through its own exertions, rather than through the coerced assistance of the
accused.
However immutable this principle might seem, it has been set aside in a
host of cases in which the criminal suspect has been compelled to aid his
accusers in their search for evidence needed to secure his conviction. The
Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C. B.A., 1980, University of Wis-
consin; J.D., 1983, University of Wisconsin Law School.
I would like to thank Junaid H. Chida for his comments, suggestions and encouragement on
an earlier draft, and Emily Field Van Tassel for her ideas, editorial assistance, and her infi-
nitely sensible decision to marry me a couple of years back.
1. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966).
2. E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7-8 (1955).
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accused has been compelled to participate in a line-up,' to speak,4 write,5 or
spell 6 particular words or phrases, to blow up a balloon,7 to walk a specified
way,' to furnish name and address,9 and to indicate whether he uses an
alias. o
The question of how these examples can be reconciled with the principle
that an accused should not be compelled to assist his accusers in their efforts
to obtain evidence against him, prompts a well settled reply: the fifth
amendment goes no further than to condemn the compulsion of incriminat-
ing testimony. The evidence or information compelled in the above listed
cases is nontestimonial, and therefore may be compelled without trans-
gressing the fifth amendment. Authority for this syllogism is derived from
the language of the fifth amendment itself: "No person ... shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... ", "To be a
witness," the Supreme Court has reasoned, is to testify. Accordingly, the
fifth amendment proscribes compulsion of incriminating evidence only inso-
far as the evidence compelled is testimonial in nature. 2 Breath, blood, fin-
gerprints, and handwriting samples, for instance, are not testimonial as such,
but are physical evidence. They are means to identify the accused. It is
accepted wisdom, therefore, that the fifth amendment is no bar to the com-
pulsion of such evidence.
This explanation begs the original question: if a purpose of the right
against compelled self-incrimination is to assure that evidence against a sus-
pect is obtained through the exertions of the accusers and not the accused,
how can the language of the right be construed to justify an abandonment of
that purpose whenever the exertions compelled are nontestimonial? The
United States Supreme Court's only answer is admirably frank, but not par-
ticularly illuminating: "If the scope of the privilege coincided with the com-
plex of values it helps to protect, we might be obliged to conclude that the
privilege was violated .... [H]owever, the privilege has never been given the
3. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
4. Id.
5. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
6. United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 371 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1099 (1977).
7. Hill v. State, 366 So. 2d 318 (Ala. 1979).
8. State v. Proctor, 535 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
9. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
10. United States v. Prewitt, 553 F.2d 1082, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 1977).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). The Court has made it clear, however, that
the testimonial requirement does not represent a judicial undertaking to divine the plain mean-
ing of the phrase "to be a witness," but rather results from a more searching analysis of the
spirit and history of that phrase. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 n.6 (1966).
12. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763.
[Vol. 36:611
Right Against Self-Incrimination
full scope which the values it helps to protect suggest." 13
In this Article it is my intention to demonstrate that the testimonial re-
quirement cannot be reconciled with the purposes served by the right against
self-incrimination, but that the requirement's existence may nevertheless be
understood as a pragmatic compromise between the government's interest in
unrestricted access to relevant evidence and the individual's fifth amendment
interest in refusing to assist his accusers in any way, shape, or form. As a
result of that compromise, the individual's right to resist more egregious
forms of compelled self-incrimination is preserved, while the government is
enabled to obtain vital nontestimonial physical evidence against criminal
suspects, with or without their cooperation.
Problems with the testimonial requirement, however, do not end with the
ascertainment of its raison d'etre. Apparent inconsistencies in the Supreme
Court's application of the requirement abound. Beginning with the premise
that the fifth amendment protects all communications or testimony,
"whatever form they might take,"' 4 the Supreme Court has held that com-
pelling a criminal suspect to submit to wearing specified articles of cloth-
ing, 5 or to having his blood tested,' 6 is nontestimonial and therefore
permissible. The Court also has rejected fifth amendment claims raised with
regard to compelled voice and handwriting exemplars, ruling that the exem-
plars themselves are nontestimonial physical evidence. 7 While the act of
producing the exemplars discloses that the suspect can do what he has been
requested to do, i.e., the suspect implicitly communicates that he can speak
or write, the Court departed from the earlier pronouncement that the fifth
amendment reaches all compelled communications, concluding instead that
while the act of producing exemplars was communicative such communica-
tions were not "sufficiently" testimonial to meet the fifth amendment
requirement. "
Similarly, in rejecting a fifth amendment challenge to a state statute re-
quiring automobile drivers to stop and identify themselves at the scene of
accidents in which they were involved,' 9 a plurality of the Court held that
the communication implicit in the driver's act of stopping and identifying
himself-that he believed he had been involved in an accident-was a non-
13. Id. at 762.
14. Id. at 763-64.
15. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 251-53 (1910).
16. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 760-65.
17. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967) (voice exemplar); Gilbert v. Cali-
fornia, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (handwriting exemplar).
18. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976).
19. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
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testimonial inference for fifth amendment purposes.2° More recently, how-
ever, the Court has held that the compelled production of a preexisting
document was sufficiently testimonial for the right to apply because the act
of producing the document amounted to testimony that the person com-
pelled to produce it was able to do so, i.e., the suspect implicitly testified that
the document existed and that the document produced was authentic.2
In sum, the Court's focus in evaluating the testimonial requirement has
gradually shifted from a simple inquiry as to whether there has been a com-
pelled communication of any kind, to a seemingly standardless ad hoc as-
sessment of whether a given communication is "sufficiently" testimonial for
purposes of fifth amendment analysis. It is my view that one can make sense
out of the testimonial requirement, and apply it coherently and consistently,
only after it is recognized that the requirement arose as a narrow exception
to the constitutional proscription of compelled incrimination that was
designed to achieve the practical result of excepting physical evidence from
fifth amendment protection. That objective can be served best by construing
the term "testify" simply to mean a communication or transmission of infor-
mation that tends to substantiate the existence or nonexistence of a fact or
other matter. In light of this definition, physical evidence, from whatever
source, may yield important information upon independent investigation
and testing by the government, but is not itself a transmission of information
from accused to accuser, and thus is not testimony. Accordingly, the sus-
pect's body may be exploited as a source of physical evidence without trans-
gressing the fifth amendment.
When, however, the suspect is compelled actively to assist the government
in obtaining physical evidence, the act of providing the assistance demanded
by producing the evidence is invariably testimonial, at least insofar as it sub-
stantiates the suspect's ability to perform the task requested. Thus, in a
murder case, the corpse itself may be nontestimonial physical evidence, but
if a murder suspect is compelled to assist the police by producing the corpse,
the suspect tacitly attests to his ability to provide the assistance requested,
i.e., he implicitly substantiates the existence and whereabouts of the body.
Similarly, a suspect compelled to provide a sample of his handwriting testi-
fies that he can do so, i.e., that he can write, even though the sample itself
may constitute nontestimonial physical evidence; the suspect's ability to
write may be a foregone conclusion, depending upon the circumstances of
the case, but that does not make the communication of such information less
testimonial. The Supreme Court's designation of this kind of testimony as
20. Id. at 433.
21. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
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insufficiently testimonial22 is thus confusing and unhelpful. More accu-
rately, in such a case, the act of producing the exemplar is compelled and
testimonial, but is insufficiently informative to be incriminating for purposes
of fifth amendment analysis.
The confusion that has resulted from the Court's decisions concerning the
testimonial component of the right against compelled self-incrimination may
be avoided if a two-part analysis is undertaken. It must first be ascertained
whether the suspect has been compelled to testify, i.e., to transmit informa-
tion tending to substantiate the existence of a fact or other matter. If so, it
must then be determined whether the compelled testimony is incriminating
under established constitutional standards. This approach to the testimonial
requirement simultaneously enables the government to obtain the nontesti-
monial or otherwise unprotected evidence in question, ensures that criminal
suspects can successfully resist more intrusive demands for incriminating
communications, and clarifies the manner in which the requirement should
be applied.
To these ends, Section I will consider the philosophical underpinnings of
the fifth amendment right against compelled self-incrimination, with special
emphasis upon the testimonial requirement. Section II will address the
foundations and early judicial interpretations of the right. Section III will
analyze the Supreme Court pronouncements on the testimonial requirement.
Finally, Section IV will present a framework for analysis of fifth amendment
claims, outlining the manner in which the testimonial requirement should be
applied.
I. PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS
By its terms, the fifth amendment provides that no person shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case "to be a witness against himself." Considered in
a vacuum, the phrase "to be a witness" is susceptible of various meanings
from the very broad to the very narrow. In perhaps the broadest sense of the
phrase, to be a witness is to be a source of evidence. Alternatively, it is to
assist in the disclosure of evidence. Narrower still, to be a witness is to tes-
tify, to attest to a fact or to communicate information. Narrowest of all, it is
to appear in court and respond to questioning under oath. When the various
meanings ascribable to the phrase "to be a witness" are evaluated in light of
the purposes that the right as a whole is intended to serve, it should be possi-
ble, one might logically suppose, better to ascertain the most appropriate
definition.
The right against compelled self-incrimination furthers a multiplicity of
22. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411.
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objectives.23 One is protection of the innocent. When threats or intimida-
tion are employed to coerce a confession from a suspect, there can be no
assurance that the suspect is testifying truthfully on the basis of his know-
ledge, and not falsely, out of fear of his accuser.24 Another objective is the
protection of society by conviction of the guilty. To convict and sentence an
innocent person on the basis of a coerced confession plainly fails to deter,
punish, rehabilitate or incapacitate the wrongdoer, leaving the guilty at lib-
erty to repeat his crime.25 Similarly, the right promotes conviction of the
guilty by encouraging witnesses to come forward and testify who might
otherwise refuse out of fear of self-incrimination.26
The Supreme Court has made it quite clear that while the right may make
the criminal process more efficacious in some cases by guarding against false
admissions of guilt prompted by coercion, that is not its primary purpose.
As a practical matter, the right impedes the truth finding process more often
than not.27 Moreover, to the extent that law enforcement agencies seek to
maximize efficiency, it is in their interest to develop self-imposed restrictions
upon investigative practices that may yield untrustworthy information,
thereby rendering superfluous those aspects of the right that enhance the
accuracy of the factfinding process. Given the Supreme Court's longstand-
ing admonition that the right is intended to protect the guilty and innocent
defendant alike,28 it would defy logic to say that this personal "right" of the
criminally accused exists primarily, or even in part, for the purpose of
streamlining the efficiency of the process whereby the accused is convicted.
In addition to the suspect goals of protecting the innocent and detecting
the guilty, the right serves to encourage diligence and discourage cruelty by
23. Whether the stated objectives or purposes commonly ascribed to the right against self-
incrimination do in fact justify its existence is a question outside the scope of this article. See
Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV.
1063 (1986) (concluding that the various rationales given in support of the right against self-
incrimination are uniformly unsatisfactory). For purposes here, I am taking the stated pur-
poses of the right at face value, in an effort to determine whether the testimonial requirement
can be justified in light of those stated purposes, irrespective of whether those purposes justify
the existence of the right.
24. E. GRISWOLD, supra note 2, at 10-19; L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
375 (1968).
25. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 187-89 (1968).
26. McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, Its Constitutional Affection,
Raison d'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, 51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
138, 143 (1960).
27. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) (the right "derogates rather than im-
proves" truthfinding); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967) ("[T]he privilege has a broader and
deeper thrust than the rule which prevents the use of confessions which are the product of
coercion because coercion is thought to carry with it the danger of unreliability.").
28. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966).
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law enforcement authorities by foreclosing the police and prosecutors from
torturing, threatening, or coercing the accused as a means to simplify their
jobs, thereby requiring reliance entirely upon their own investigative efforts
to obtain evidence against the suspect.2 9 Still another purpose served by the
right is preservation of the accusatorial system of justice. The principles that
an accused is legally innocent until proven guilty and that the burden is at all
times upon the prosecution to establish the defendant's guilt, commend a
rule requiring the accuser to "shoulder the entire load" of the criminal inves-
tigation, without the compelled cooperation of the accused.3 ° A final value
arguably preserved is a general right of privacy-the right to be left alone.
31
Upon consideration of the several purposes served by the right, it is possi-
ble to reject the most broad and most narrow of the four alternative con-
structions posited earlier for the phrase "to be a witness." To define the
concept of being a witness in its broadest sense is to construe it so as to reach
all situations in which the accused is a source of evidence. Such a definition
encompasses not only those cases in which the suspect is obliged actively to
assist his accusers by providing them with evidence of any and all kinds, but
also includes those cases in which the accused is compelled to submit pas-
sively to a search or inspection of his body. In light of the purposes served
by the right, compelling a suspect to submit to inspection, examination, and
so on, is unobjectionable. While these investigative activities intrude upon
the suspect's privacy, the Supreme Court has apparently debunked the no-
tion that the fifth amendment is calculated to protect a general right of pri-
vacy. 32 It certainly has no adverse impact upon the veracity of evidence
thereby obtained, does not alter the prosecution's duty to gather evidence
exclusively through its own efforts, and does not relieve the prosecution of
its burden of proof. A suspect compelled to submit to a search or inspection
29. See Dolinko, supra note 23, at 1077 n.78 and authorities cited therein ("The belief that
the privilege against self-incrimination is a safeguard against torture is widespread."); see also 5
W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 194 (1927); J. WIGMORE, TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE § 2263, at 3123 (1904).
30. Tehan, 382 U.S. at 415; United States v. Yurasovich, 580 F.2d 1212 (3d Cir. 1978).
31. Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 435-36 (1980). In
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1974), the Court remarked that a purpose of the right
is to protect the individual's private "inner sanctum." Two years later, however, in Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the Court cast considerable doubt upon the continuing
vitality of that notion.
We cannot cut the Fifth Amendment completely loose from the moorings of its lan-
guage, and make it serve as a general protector of privacy-a word not mentioned in
its text and a concept directly addressed in the Fourth Amendment. We adhere to
the view that the Fifth Amendment protects against "compelled self-incrimination,
not [the disclosure of] private information."
Id. at 401.
32. See supra note 31.
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of his person is under no compulsion to give his accusers evidence, but is
obliged only to sit still while evidence is gathered through the independent
investigation of the prosecution.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, it is plainly unjustifiable to confine
the definition of being a witness solely to the declarations of persons under
oath in courtroom proceedings. The "classic" case of a confession elicited
by torture and introduced into evidence through the testimony of the tor-
turer, violates every conceivable purpose of the fifth amendment, but would
be unassailable if the right against self-incrimination were available only to
courtroom witnesses.
Of the two remaining definitions of being a witness against oneself-one
who actively assists his accuser and one who testifies against himself-the
former would seem to be more compatible with the purposes of the right.
When a suspect is compelled affirmatively to assist his accusers by producing.
incriminating evidence, the government is relieved of its burden of garnering
evidence against the accused exclusively through its own efforts. That bur-
den is instead shifted to the accused, and is thus contrary to an accusatorial
system of justice, regardless of whether the evidence compelled takes the
form of testimony. The more actively a suspect is compelled to cooperate
with his accusers, the more obvious the fifth amendment implications. To
that extent, the compulsion of testimony may constitute a more serious in-
fraction than the compulsion of most nontestimonial evidence, but that
would seem to be a difference of degree and not of kind.
The only coherent justification for defining "to be a witness" more restric-
tively, so as to mean to testify, is the earlier raised and rejected notion that
one purpose of the right is to maximize the efficacy of the criminal process
by enhancing protection of the innocent and detection of the guilty. The
veracity of nontestimonial evidence, be it a murder weapon, a voice or writ-
ing sample, or the results of a line-up or breath test, is normally going to be
unaffected by whether such evidence is obtained with the active assistance of
the accused.33 Only when the compelled assistance takes the form of testi-
33. Unlike blood or fingerprints, the suspect does exert some control over his voice and
handwriting, and is thus in a position to falsify them in an effort to evade detection. See Dann,
The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Extorting Physical Evidence From
a Suspect, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 597 (1970). However, in compelling a suspect to furnish a
handwriting or voice exemplar, there is comparatively little risk that the coercion employed to
obtain the samples, as distinguished from the suspect's guilty conscience, will affect their relia-
bility. In other words, in response to a demand for exemplars, a guilty suspect's fear of detec-
tion may prompt him to adulterate his handwriting or voice, but an innocent suspect's fear of
his accusers is likely to prompt him merely to accede to the demand, with no adverse effect on
the reliability of the sample offered. Because the utilization of coercive tactics to obtain exem-
plars does not appreciably increase the risk that an innocent person will be convicted, crime
control concerns are satisfied.
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mony from the lips of the accused, does the trustworthiness of the evidence
thereby obtained become a concern. It is only then that the risk arises that
an innocent suspect will make a false admission of guilt to satisfy the coer-
cive demands of his accusers. If one proceeds on the assumption that the
right should be construed to maximize the truthfinding capacity of the crimi-
nal process, a "testimonial" requirement is optimal because it prevents the
government from compelling potentially unreliable communications, while
enabling it to obtain a variety of probative nontestimonial evidence that
could not be obtained if the government were generally prohibited from en-
listing the suspect's active assistance.
While maximizing the trustworthiness and efficiency of the evidence gath-
ering process may not be among the purposes of the right against self-in-
crimination, the government's interest in an effective system of crime control
is nevertheless an omnipresent counterweight to the full and free exercise of
procedural rights in general, and fifth amendment rights in particular.34 The
testimonial requirement may thus be understood to represent a balance
struck between the values the right was intended to protect, and the practi-
cal need for effective crime control.
3 5
A primary impediment to ready acceptance of this explanation is that the
testimonial requirement has never been justified by the Court in terms of
such a compromise or balancing of interests. In Schmerber v. California, the
Court conceded that the requirement is at odds with the values protected by
the privilege, but held that the requirement is nevertheless appropriate in
light of a "long line of authorities in lower courts," that have "consistently
limited" application of the privilege to testimonial compulsion.36 There is
34. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 (1970) ("Tension between the State's demand
for disclosures and the protection of the right against self-incrimination ... must be resolved in
terms of balancing the public need on the one hand, and the individual claim to constitutional
protections on the other."); see generally H. PACKER, supra note 25.
35. The fifth amendment right against self-incrimination is stated in absolute terms, and
would not appear to allow for a balancing of this sort. The first amendment freedom of speech,
however, is likewise stated in the absolute, yet the Supreme Court has long resolved claims of
first amendment violation by balancing the interests of government and individual. In some
situations, the Court has balanced the respective interests of the parties categorically, as in the
case of "fighting words," in which the Court has held that whatever first amendment interest
the individual may have in making such utterances is "clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). First
amendment claims not amenable to categorical treatment are resolved by a balancing of the
interests at stake on a case-by-case basis. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36
(1961). In the context of the fifth amendment, the testimonial requirement may simply be
viewed as the product of a categorical balancing of interests, in which the Court has deter-
mined that whatever fifth amendment interest a suspect may have in refusing to make nontesti-
monial disclosures is inevitably outweighed by the government's interest in obtaining such
disclosures.
36. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762-63 (1966).
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no indication, however, as to which if any of the explanations supporting a
testimonial requirement proffered in this line of lower court cases justified
the requirement in the Court's view.3 7 In order to better understand the
purpose of the testimonial requirement, and the manner in which it has been
construed, it is useful to review the origins of the right and the line of early
lower court cases to which the Supreme Court refers.
II. ORIGINS AND EARLY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RIGHT
The right against self-incrimination became a part of the English common
law in the mid-1600's, following the celebrated trials of John Lilburne, in
which the defendant's adamant refusals to testify against himself were ulti-
mately, albeit grudgingly, respected by the presiding judges.38 Prior to that
time, the common practice among the ecclesiastical courts of England had
been to put the defendant upon his oath and compel a statement from him as
to the crimes of which he was accused.39
The American colonies borrowed heavily from England's common law of
criminal procedure, making no exception for the right against compelled
self-incrimination.' By the mid-eighteenth century, the right was firmly es-
tablished throughout the colonies.4 ' In 1776, George Mason incorporated a
self-incrimination clause into the Virginia state constitution, and seven other
states followed suit shortly thereafter.42 With the constitutional provisions
of Virginia and several other states to guide him, James Madison drafted the
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution in 1789."3 Unlike the
state constitutions, which had phrased the clause in terms of a right not to be
compelled to "give evidence," "furnish evidence," or "secure evidence,"
Madison's version was unique in phrasing the provision in terms of a right
not to be compelled to "be a witness."'  Latter day scholars and courts are
in agreement, however, that the differences in phrasing do not reflect in-
tended differences in meaning. The several provisions share a common ori-
gin, and regardless of whether the words read "to give evidence," "to be a
witness," or as is the case in some states, "to testify," the variations in se-
mantics do not warrant variation in interpretation.45
37. Id.
38. L. LEVY, supra note 24, at 301-13.
39. Id. at 266-300.
40. Id. at 371-75.
41. Id. at 368-404.
42. Id. at 405-09.
43. Id. at 422.
44. Id. at 410, 423.
45. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761-62 n.6 (1966) (quoting Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892)); Counselman, 142 U.S. at 584-85 (the various state and
[Vol. 36:611
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Early judicial interpretations of the right offer some clues as to the mean-
ing ascribed to these variously worded phrases. Until the turn of the twenti-
eth century, contrary to the Supreme Court's observation in Schmerber, a
majority of courts addressing the issue were of the opinion that the right to
refuse to give evidence, to be a witness, or to testify, encompassed a right to
refuse to cooperate passively or actively with prosecutorial authorities.
Thus, it was generally held that a defendant could not be compelled to make
a footprint (for purposes of comparison to a track found at the scene of a
crime),46 to participate in a physical examination,47 to exhibit a part of his
body,4" or to wear particular clothing.49
The principle underlying these decisions was relatively straightforward:
federal provisions relating to the right against self-incrimination, "however differently worded,
should have as far as possible the same interpretation"); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78,
92 (1908) ("[A]I the States of the Union have, from time to time, with varying form but
uniform meaning, included the [self-incrimination] privilege in their constitutions .... "); see
also J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2263, at 378 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (It is
"immaterial that the witness is protected by one constitution from 'testifying,' or by another
from 'furnishing evidence,' or by still another from 'being a witness.' These various phrasings
have a common conception, in respect to the form of the protected disclosure.") (emphasis in
original).
46. "[B]y the weight of authority it is held to be error to compel the accused to
submit to a comparison of footprints and to permit a witness who was present when
the accused was forcibly compelled to place his foot in footprints, or to surrender his
shoes for the purpose of making a comparison, to testify as to the result .... "
State v. Sirmay, 40 Utah 525, 537, 122 P. 748, 753 (1912); Cooper v. State, 86 Ala. 610, 6 So.
110 (1889) (admission of evidence that defendant refused to make tracks in his stocking feet
for comparison purposes was reversible error); Day v. State, 63 Ga. 667 (1879); State v. Griffin,
129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81 (1924); Stokes v. State, 64 Tenn. 619 (1875).
47. People v. Akin, 25 Cal. App. 373, 143 P. 795 (1914); State v. Horton, 247 Mo. 657,
153 S.W. 1051 (1913) (reversible error to compel accused to undergo physical examination);
Bowers v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. 185, 75 S.W. 299 (1903); Whitehead v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. 89,
45 S.W. 10 (1898).
48. State v. Jacobs, 50 N.C. 259 (1858) (defendant cannot be compelled to exhibit himself
as a means to establish that he is a free negro); Blackwell v. State, 67 Ga. 76 (1881) (it was
error to compel the defendant to exhibit his leg); State v. Garrett, 71 N.C. 85, 87 (1874) (im-
permissible to compel an accused to unwrap a bandage and exhibit a wound; once done, how-
ever, a witness' testimony concerning the wound was admissible); see also Aiken v. State, 16
Ga. App. 848, 86 S.E. 1076 (1915) (it was error to compel defendant to stand in a window for
identification).
49. People v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228, 15 N.W. 95 (1883) (a prisoner cannot be required to
measure or try on a shoe; it is permissible, however, if he does so voluntarily); Gallaher v.
State, 28 Tex. App. 247, 281, 125 S.W. 1087, 1095 (1889) (no violation of right where defend-
ant voluntarily dons a hat and mask; however, "if in his case, the defendant had declined to be
distinguished and exhibited, the court would doubtless have protected him in his constitutional
right to be exempted from giving evidence against himself"); Turman v. State, 50 Tex. Crim.
7, 95 S.W. 533 (1906) (defendant cannot be compelled to put a cap on his head); Ward v. State,
27 Okla. Crim. 362, 228 P. 498 (1924) (defendant may not be compelled to put on a coat);
Reyes v. Municipal Court, 41 P.R. 892 (1931) (defendant may not be compelled to dishevel his
hair and pull down his cap).
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the right against compelled self-incrimination prohibited the state from com-
pelling a criminal defendant to "testify," to "be a witness," to "give evi-
dence," or to "furnish evidence" against himself, and that meant that "the
accused cannot be compelled to do or say anything that may tend to crimi-
nate him, and his refusal to do so cannot be proved as a circumstance against
him."5 Compelling a defendant to "make evidence" against himself, by
putting on a cap or making a footprint, was thus prohibited, for it compelled
him to do something that might tend to be incriminating."
While it is accurate to characterize the position reflected in these cases as
the majority view, a significant minority of jurisdictions took a contrary po-
sition. Some courts ascribed to the principle that the purpose of the right
was to assist the pursuit of truth, and because physical evidence, unlike a
confession, could not be fabricated or distorted by compulsion, the right
against compelled self-incrimination did not apply to the coerced production
of such evidence.52 Along somewhat similar lines, other courts held that
while compelling the disclosure of physical evidence may have violated the
defendant's right against compelled self-incrimination, the veracity of evi-
dence thus obtained was indisputable and, therefore, the illegality of the
state's conduct did not render the evidence inadmissible.5 3 At least two
courts, faced with cases involving compelled submission rather than com-
pelled assistance, ruled that compelling the suspect to submit to testing and
examination was permissible, because in such cases it is the police who take,
rather than the suspect who gives, evidence.54 Still other courts simply re-
jected the defendant's self-incrimination claims without any explanation at
50. Davis v. State, 131 Ala. 10, 16, 31 So. 569, 571 (1902).
51. Stokes v. State, 64 Tenn. 619, 621 (1875). "In the presence of the jury the prisoner is
asked to make evidence against himself. The court should not have permitted the pan of mud
to be brought before the jury, and the defendant asked to put his foot in it." Id. at 621; see also
Cooper v. State, 86 Ala. 610, 6 So. 110, 111 (1889) (a witness cannot be compelled "to give [or
make]" evidence against himself).
52. "It is true that this ground upon which this testimony is said to be admissible is
that in these cases the physical facts speak for themselves, and no facts or hopes of
the prisoner could produce or effect a resemblance of his track, or of the wounds or
clothing, and their resemblance aids the jury in their search after the truth."
Bruce v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 590, 593, 21 S.W. 681, 682 (1893); Magee v. State, 92 Miss. 865,
46 So. 529 (1908) (defendant can be compelled to place his foot in a track for comparison,
because such compulsion presents no risk to truthfinding).
53. Morris v. State, 124 Ala. 44, 46-47, 27 So. 336, 337 (1900); State v. Fuller, 34 Mont.
12, 22, 85 P. 369, 372 (1906); State v. McIntosh, 94 S.C. 439, 441-42, 78 S.E. 327, 328-29
(1913).
54. Magee v. State, 92 Miss. 865, 874-75, 46 So. 529, 532 (1908) (" 'We think that officers
having a prisoner in custody have a right to acquire information about him, even by force, and
that, for example, when his photograph is taken, or his measurement taken, it is simply the act
of the officers, and is not compelling him to give evidence against himself.'" (quoting United




Finally, a number of courts adopted the view that the right against com-
pelled self-incrimination proscribes only the compulsion of incriminating
testimony, and that insofar as the coerced disclosure of physical evidence
from the accused did not constitute compelled testimony, the right did not
apply. Even within this group of cases, however, disparate opinions were
expressed as to the definition of testimony. Some courts took the view that
"to testify" was to bear witness in a court of law, and rejected self-incrimina-
tion claims made with respect to compelled pre-trial physical examinations,
not on the grounds that such examinations were noncommunicative, but be-
cause they took place outside the courtroom. 6
A handful of other courts defined "to testify" essentially as to communi-
cate information attesting to guilt (variously phrased in terms of making
"utterances," "declarations," etc.), and decided that because physical evi-
dence was not communication as such, it was not testimony, and therefore
fell outside the protection of the right.57 Considering that, as of the turn of
the twentieth century, these few courts represented the lone adherents to one
of several justifications for the minority view that the right against compelled
self-incrimination applied only to the compelled production of testimony,
one is led to inquire as to how and why this particular justification ultimately
came to rule the day in both the state and federal courts.
It may well be that Professor John Wigmore, more than any other individ-
ual, is responsible for the ultimate proliferation of the testimonial require-
ment. Wigmore was among the earliest, best known, and most respected
advocates of the proposition that the right against self-incrimination applied
only to testimonial compulsion. It is evident that his treatise on evidence
was influential among courts adopting that proposition.58 Moreover, it is
55. State v. Ruck, 194 Mo. 416, 92 S.W. 706 (1906); People v. Austin, 199 N.Y. 446, 93
N.E. 57 (1910); People v. Van Wormer, 175 N.Y. 188, 67 N.E. 299 (1903).
56. O'Brien v. State, 125 Ind. 38, 44-45, 25 N.E. 137, 139 (1890); State v. Garrett, 71 N.C.
85, 87 (1874).
The prisoner objected to the admissibility of the evidence as to the condition of her
hand and relied on the case of State v. Jacobs .... The distinction between that and
our case is that in Jacobs' case, the prisoner himself, on trial, was compelled to ex-
hibit himself to the jury, that they might see that he was within the prohibited degree
of color, thus he was forced to become a witness against himself.... In our case, not
the prisoners, but the witnesses, were called to prove what they saw upon inspecting
the prisoner's hand, although that inspection was obtained by intimidation.
Id. (emphasis in original).
57. Magee v. State, 92 Miss. 865, 46 So. 529 (1908) (utterances); State v. Fuller, 34 Mont.
12, 85 P. 369 (1906) (admission); State v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79 (1879); People v. Gardner,
144 N.Y. 119, 38 N.E. 1003 (1894) (declarations); White v. State, 62 S.W. 749 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1901) (statement).
58. See, e.g., Magee,, 92 Miss. at 871-74, 46 So. at 530-31; Fuller, 34 Mont. at 18-20, 85 P.
1987]
Catholic University Law Review
clear that Wigmore's thinking exerted a profound influence upon the
Supreme Court in Schmerber and its progeny. While the Schmerber Court
declined to adopt the Wigmore formulation in full, it made repeated refer-
ences to Wigmore's treatise in support of its holding that the fifth amend-
ment reaches no further than an accused's communications,59 prompting
Justice Black to remark in his dissent: "Though my admiration for Profes-
sor Wigmore's scholarship is great, I regret to see the word he used to nar-
row the Fifth Amendment's protection ['testimonial'] play such a major part
in any of this Court's opinions."'
In the original 1904 edition of his treatise on evidence, Wigmore offered
three justifications for his view that the right against self-incrimination ap-
plied only to the "employment of legal process to extract from the person's
own lips an admission of his guilt."'6 The first justification was that the
right originally arose in response to "the process of the ecclesiastical [c]ourt,
as opposed through two centuries,-the inquisitorial method of putting the
accused upon his oath, in order to supply the lack of the required two wit-
nesses." '62 The second justification was based upon the "policy of the privi-
lege as a defensible institution," which in Wigmore's view was simply "to
stimulate the prosecution to a full and fair search for evidence procurable by
their own exertions.",63 The third and final justification for limiting the
scope of the privilege against self-incrimination to testimonial compulsion
was the "practical requirement that follows from the necessity of recogniz-
ing other unquestioned methods of procuring evidence."'  If the privilege
afforded protection not only for the suspect's "physical control of his own
vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever form exer-
cised," then, Wigmore concluded,
it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his
house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the au-
thority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be
obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling
the surrender of the evidential articles,-a clear reductio ad
absurdum.65
at 371; see also Dann, supra note 33, at 599 ("[Wigmore's] statements concerning the scope of
the privilege are referred to for support by virtually every court and commentator that has
dealt with the problem.").
59. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761-63 (1966).
60. Id. at 774 (Black, J., dissenting).







Wigmore's first justification, while correct, is of questionable relevance.
The simple, unremarkable fact is that the early English courts had, and took,
the opportunity to recognize the suspect's right to refuse to confess his
crimes, but either had, or took, no like occasion to recognize the suspect's
right to refuse to disclose physical evidence. That the latter issue did not
arise in the early cases is hardly overwhelming evidence that if it had, the
suspect's assertion of the right would or should have been rejected. The
nonoccurrence of such an issue may just as easily be ascribed to the compar-
atively insignificant role of physical evidence as a form of proof in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries vis-i-vis the present day.66
As to Wigmore's second justification, it would not appear that the policy
of the privilege, as Wigmore characterizes it, lends any support whatever to
his conclusion that only testimonial compulsion should be protected. If the
right is designed to assure that any evidence gathered against the accused is
obtained through the exertions of the prosecution alone, it would be inappro-
priate for the prosecution to garner evidence against the suspect by means
that compel him to assist in producing such evidence, regardless of whether
that evidence takes the form of testimony.67
This brings us to Wigmore's third and final justification for limiting the
scope of the right to testimonial disclosures-practical necessity. Wigmore
overstates the case in suggesting that if nontestimonial compulsion were pro-
scribed by the privilege, a suspect could escape prosecution by locking him-
self and the evidence against him in his room. A search of a suspect's room
or person requires no exertions from the suspect. In such a case, the suspect
does not incriminate himself; rather he is incriminated through the in-
dependent investigation of the police. Compelled, nontestimonial coopera-
tion could thus be prohibited without affecting the prosecution's right to
undertake unassisted searches for evidence.
66. As discussed in greater detail at the end of this section, the establishment of forensic
science and the concomitant need for a wide variety of physical evidence did not emerge until
the end of the nineteenth century. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text. Indeed,
Jacobs Law Dictionary, published in 1782, does not even make passing reference to physical,
or demonstrative proof or its equivalent in its six page definition of the term "evidence."
Rather, "[e]vidence... is u[s]ed in the law for [s]ome proof, by te[s]timony of men on oath, or
by writings or records." JACOB'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1782).
67. McNaughton's revision of Wigmore's treatise appears to have recognized this problem
and, in an effort to salvage Wigmore's conclusion that the policy of the privilege dictates that
only testimonial compulsion be protected, McNaughton simply changed the original author's
characterization of the policy the privilege protects:
Such, too, is the main thrust of the policies of the privilege .... While the policies
admittedly apply to some extent to nontestimonial cooperation, it is in testimonial
disclosures only that the oath and private thoughts and beliefs of the individual-and
therefore the fundamental sentiments supporting the privilege-are involved.
J. WIGMORE, supra note 45, § 2263, at 379.
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Nevertheless, Wigmore's general point is a good one. The state has an
indispensable need to obtain physical evidence from the suspect's person,
and there is often no way to obtain such evidence without at least some
cooperation from the suspect. It is probably safe to say that if a criminal
suspect could not be compelled to take a breathalizer test, to participate in
line-ups, to stand for identification, and so on, law enforcement efforts would
be severely hampered.68
This purely practical concern may well furnish the one unifying feature to
that otherwise disparate minority of early American cases holding that the
right against compelled self-incrimination did not apply to compelling a sus-
pect to produce physical evidence. While in no case is practical necessity the
only reason given for sanctioning the compelled production of this kind of
evidence, when the many and varied reasons are tallied, it nevertheless
proves to be among the most common. 69 The emergence and eventual ac-
ceptance of the testimonial requirement closely parallels advances in forensic
science, developed in response to the changing character of criminal con-
duct, which rendered "nontestimonial" evidence (physical evidence obtained
from the suspect's person) indispensable in crime detection.
The latter half of the nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of a
professional criminal class throughout Europe and the eastern United
States.70 One contemporary account estimated that during the 1860's, there
were 2,500 professional criminals in New York City alone, ranging from
68. 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 7.2, at 556 (1984).
69. United States v. Cross, 20 D.C. (9 Mackey) 365, 382 (1892).
What would be the consequence if such evidence should be entirely excluded? You
could not compel a person after his arrest to empty his pockets and disclose a
weapon, when the most vital evidence on the part of the Government, in a homicide
case, is the possession of the deadly weapon .... We think that officers having a
prisoner in custody have a right to acquire information about him, even by force.
Id.; O'Brien v. State, 125 Ind. 38, 44, 25 N.E. 137, 139 (1890)
("To hold that the testimony of the witness was incompetent would compel us in
every case involving the identity of a person accused of crime to hold that testimony
as to marks and scars hidden under the clothing which he wears is inadmissible if the
information of the witness was obtained without the consent of the accused .... );
Magee v. State, 92 Miss. 865, 874, 46 So. 529, 531 (1908) (quoting and following Cross); State
v. Fuller, 34 Mont. 12, 20, 85 P. 369, 371-72 (1906) (quoting practical concerns expressed by
Wigmore and by the Gardner Court); People v. Gardner, 144 N.Y. 119, 128, 38 N.E. 1003,
1005 (1894)
("A prisoner's person may be examined for marks and bruises, and then they may be
proved upon his trial to establish this guilt; and it would be stretching the constitu-
tional inhibition too far to make it cover such cases and cases like this, and the
inhibition thus applied would greatly embarrass the administration of justice.")
70. R. LANE, POLICING THE CITY: BOSTON 1822-1885, at 142-46 (1967).
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shoplifters and pickpockets to burglars and bank robbers. 71 The develop-
ment of sophisticated techniques for committing crimes and evading detec-
tion left the public increasingly vulnerable, and prompted an outcry for an
aggressive response from the police. 72 The police, however, were initially ill-
equipped to respond effectively or efficiently. As one scholar explains in his
study of the Boston police force:
In part this inefficiency resulted from a lack of technical tools.
Some of the achievements of mid-century technology, such as the
telegraph, were used in pursuing wanted persons. And in 1862 the
Boston police chief instituted a rogues' gallery of several hundred
daguerreotypes, to supplement the handbills, verbal descriptions,
and mnemonic powers of his detectives. But there was still little
which could be used in establishing the identities of persons
unknown.73
Change was not long in coming. In the 1870's, Alphonse Bertillon devel-
oped a systematic procedure for distinguishing individuals. Called anthro-
pometry, Bertillon devised a series of body measurements as a means for
identification.74 It was also Bertillon who sought to introduce professional
handwriting analysis into the context of a criminal investigation.75
In 1892, Francis Galton published Fingerprints, a work containing the
first statistical support for the uniqueness of fingerprints.7 6 Scotland Yard
began to use fingerprinting as an identification method in 1901, and the
United States followed suit shortly thereafter. 77 In 1901, Dr. Karl Land-
steiner discovered that blood could be grouped into types,78 and about the
same time, a test was devised for distinguishing blood from other stains in
cloth.79
With the rise of a professional criminal class, and developments in foren-
sic science to combat that rise, came an ever-increasing government need for
access to physical evidence and a judicial interpretation to accommodate
that need. It was in 1910, as these fledgling discoveries and procedures were
beginning to gain acceptability as methods of crime detection, that the
71. Crapsey, Our Criminal Population, VIII GALAXY 346 (Oct. 1869), cited in R. LANE,
supra note 70, at 143-44.
72. R. LANE, supra note 70, at 222.
73. Id. at 149.
74. R. SAFERSTEIN, CRIMINALISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC SCIENCE 4
(1977).
75. F. INBAU, A. MOENSSENS & L. VITULLO, SCIENTIFIC POLICE INVESTIGATION 42-43
(1972).
76. R. SAFERSTEIN, supra note 74, at 4.
77. S. KIND & M. OVERMAN, SCIENCE AGAINST CRIME 21 (1972).
78. R. SAFERSTEIN, supra note 74, at 4.
79. J. HALL, INSIDE THE CRIME LAB 7 (1974).
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Supreme Court took its first opportunity to address the propriety of compel-
ling a suspect to disclose incriminating physical evidence.
III. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS
In Holt v. United States,80 Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court,
described and resolved the issue before the Court as follows:
A question arose as to whether a blouse belonged to the prisoner.
A witness testified that the prisoner put it on and it fitted him. It is
objected that he did this under the same duress that made his state-
ments inadmissible, and that it should be excluded for the same
reasons. But the prohibition of compelling a man in criminal court
to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. The
objection in principle would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and
compare his features with a photograph in proof.81
Justice Holmes offered no explanation for why the right should apply only to
compelled "communications," except to say that it should not apply to
something other than communications. The logical consequence of a con-
trary holding, the Court asserted, would be to invalidate compelling a sus-
pect to present himself for identification-a longstanding method of
obtaining important, if not indispensable, evidence against the accused. The
Supreme Court's adoption of the testimonial requirement in Holt thus ap-
pears to rest largely, if not exclusively, upon the idea expressed by Wigmore
less than a decade previously, that limiting the right to compelled and in-
criminating communications "is the practical requirement that follows from
the necessity of recognizing other unquestioned methods of procuring
evidence." 82
The Court did not address the issue again until Schmerber was decided
some fifty years later.8 3 Defendant Schmerber was stopped for drunk driv-
80. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
81. Id. at 252-53.
82. J. WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2263, at 3123.
83. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In the interim, the "mere evidence rule" was born, bred and
died. Prior to Holt, in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Court had held that a
subpoena duces tecum compelling a suspect to produce his private papers simultaneously vio-
lated the fourth amendment, which forbade the government from seizing papers that legally
belonged to the suspect alone, and the fifth amendment, which forbade the government from
taking a suspect's papers against his will and using their contents against him. On the author-
ity of Boyd, the mere evidence rule was spawned in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298
(1920). The focus of the Gouled Court's attention was on the fourth amendment. Search
warrants, the Court concluded, may not be used as a means for obtaining mere evidence
against a suspect; rather, the public or complainant must have a possessory or other legal
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ing and was compelled to submit to a blood-alcohol test, the results of which
contributed to his conviction. The Supreme Court rejected the claim that
the compelled production of a blood sample from Schmerber's body violated
his right against compelled self-incrimination. Justice Brennan, writing for a
5-4 majority, allowed that "[i]f the scope of the privilege coincided with the
complex of values it helps to protect, we might be obliged to conclude that
the privilege was violated.",
84
The Court was nevertheless of the view that "the privilege has never been
given the full scope which the values it helps to protect suggest. ' '8 ' "History
and a long line of authorities in lower courts," the majority opined, have
''consistently limited" the protection of the right to an accused's testimony
or communications.8 6 Three sources of authority are cited in support of this
interest in the property to be seized before the search and seizure is proper. As in Boyd,
however, the Gouled Court's decision was decided on fifth amendment grounds as well:
[T]he result is the same to one accused of a crime, whether he be obliged to supply
evidence against himself or whether such evidence be obtained by an illegal search of
his premises and seizure of his private papers. In either case he is the unwilling
source of the evidence and the fifth amendment forbids that he shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself in a criminal case.
Id. at 255.
Gouled made no reference to the pronouncement in Holt that the fifth amendment applies
only to compelled communications; while the documents at issue in Gouled contained commu-
nications, the Gouled decision was in no way logically limited to searches and seizures of
communicative evidence, and was in fact subsequently applied to invalidate searches and
seizures of physical evidence. See, e.g., Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir.
1958) (excluding stained handkerchief).
Gouled led a hard and unpopular life. As a philosophical matter, its interpretation of the
fifth amendment could not be justified in terms of the objectives underlying the right, because
as previously noted, those objectives are not threatened by compelling a suspect merely to
submit to a search, be it a search of his body or other property. See supra text accompanying
note 32. And as a practical matter, the decision portended to deprive the government of access
to vitally needed evidence. As a consequence, Gouled was rejected by several state courts, and
circumvented by federal courts to the extent possible. See I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE 489 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing the history of the mere evidence rule). Ultimately, the
fourth amendment component of the holding in Gouled was overturned in Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967), the fifth amendment ruling that searches and seizures of mere evidence
generally violate the suspect's right against self-incrimination was silently rejected in Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), and in Andreson v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), the
Court explicitly held that the search for and seizure of a suspect's documents did not constitute
compelled communication and thus did not violate the fifth amendment.
84. 384 U.S. at 762. The Court noted that compelled submission fails to respect "'the
inviolability of the human personality. Moreover, since it enables the State to rely on evidence
forced from the accused, the compulsion violates at least one meaning of the requirement that
the state procure the evidence against the accused 'by its own independent labors.'" Id. As
previously suggested, however, it is doubtful whether compelled submission, as distinguished
from affirmative assistance, does implicate these values.
85. 384 U.S. at 762.
86. Id. at 762-67.
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conclusion-Holt, Wigmore's treatise on evidence, and the state court cases
cited in Wigmore's treatise. On the basis of this authority, the Court ruled
categorically that the right against compelled self-incrimination applies only
to the compulsion of incriminating testimony or communications.
Given the Court's statements suggesting that compelling production of
nontestimonial evidence is at odds with the values underlying the right, one
is naturally inclined to wonder why the Court found the cited authority per-
suasive. The opinion offers no explanation. It is nevertheless worth recal-
ling that Holt, Wigmore, and many of the early state court cases Wigmore
cites, justified the testimonial requirement in terms of the practical need for
government access to nontestimonial physical evidence.8 7
The year following Schmerber, the Court decided the companion cases of
United States v. Wade88 and Gilbert v. California. 89 In Wade, the defendant
was identified by a witness after he was compelled to participate in a line-up
and to speak the words "put the money in the bag." Similarly, in Gilbert,
the defendant was identified after being compelled to furnish a sample of his
handwriting for purposes of comparison to a note the robber had given the
bank teller. On the basis of Schmerber, the Court ruled that the compelled
incrimination in Gilbert and Wade did not violate the fifth amendment, rea-
soning that:
One's voice and handwriting are, of course, means of communica-
tion. It by no means follows, however, that every compulsion of an
accused to use his voice or write compels a communication within
the cover of the privilege. A mere handwriting exemplar, in con-
trast to the content of what is written, like the voice or body itself,
is an identifying physical characteristic outside its protection.90
Unlike in Schmerber and Holt, in Wade and Gilbert the suspect was com-
pelled actively to assist the government in its search for incriminating evi-
dence.9 Cases of compelled assistance, as distinguished from submission,
87. See supra notes 61-82 and accompanying text. This is not to suggest that Justice
Brennan espoused an explicit balancing of interests approach to the fifth amendment. To the
contrary, he did not favor such an approach. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 464-65,
473-74 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The point remains that in Schmerber, Justice Brennan
assigned nontestimonial compulsion a place within the perimeter of conduct undercutting val-
ues protected by the fifth amendment, yet concluded that because such conduct does not strike
so close to the core of the right as "to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment,"
nontestimonial compulsion is permissible. 384 U.S. at 762. On the basis of the authority Jus-
tice Brennan cited, the only consistent and coherent justification offered for permitting such
peripheral assaults on the fifth amendment is that the defendant's fifth amendment interest is
outweighed by the government's interest in an orderly and efficient criminal process.
88. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
89. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
90. Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 266-67.
91. In Holt, the suspect was compelled to put on a shirt, which might ordinarily be
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present two special problems. The first problem, as discussed in section I, is
that compelling an accused to assist in his own undoing is difficult to recon-
cile with the purposes the right is intended to serve, unless one simply con-
cedes as much, but concludes that whatever fifth amendment interest the
suspect has in refusing to provide nontestimonial evidence is outweighed by
the government's practical need to obtain such evidence.
The second problem is that there is a testimonial aspect inherent in every
act of compelled cooperation, even if the fifth amendment limits the meaning
of being a witness to testifying or communicating. When a suspect is or-
dered to perform an affirmative act as a means for the government to obtain
evidence, what is compelled is not only the evidence itself, but also the act of
producing that evidence. The evidence itself may be noncommunicative;
however, implicit in every act of producing evidence is a testimonial commu-
nication or substantiation of the suspect's ability to perform the requested
act. The exemplars in Wade and Gilbert may have been noncommunicative
or nontestimonial in and of themselves. In producing them, however, the
suspects necessarily communicated that they were able to speak or write the
words in question.
Neither of these problems was acknowledged or addressed in Wade and
Gilbert. The Court drew no distinction between compelled submission in
Schmerber and compelled assistance in Wade and Gilbert, and made no at-
tempt to reconcile compelling the accused's affirmative cooperation with the
purposes served by the right. The Court likewise failed to consider the testi-
monial aspect inherent in the act of producing the exemplars. A decade
later, in Fisher v. United States,92 the Court acknowledged that a handwrit-
ing exemplar communicated first, that the suspect could write, and second,
that the exemplar furnished was in the suspect's handwriting, but remarked
that "in common experience, the first would be a near truism, and the latter
self-evident," and that nothing the suspect has said or done "is deemed to be
sufficiently testimonial for purposes of the privilege."93 It is not enough,
then, for the conduct compelled to be merely testimonial; it must be "suffi-
ciently" so. The $64,000 question, of course, is: when is a testimonial act
sufficiently testimonial?
Three years after Wade and Gilbert were decided, the matter was further
thought of as active assistance. In effect, however, Holt was required merely to submit pas-
sively to a measurement of his body-his assistance was unnecessary. Cf Gilbert, 388 U.S. at
265 and Wade, 388 U.S. at 220, where the only means for the government to obtain the evi-
dence sought was with the suspect's cooperation.
92. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
93. Id. at 411.
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confused in California v. Byers. 94 Byers was convicted of causing an auto-
mobile accident by improperly passing and of failing to stop and leave his
name and address at the scene of the automobile accident, as required by
California statute.
95
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a plurality of four, concluded that the
disclosure sought by the statute was neither incriminating nor testimonial,
and rejected Byers' claim that the statute violated his fifth amendment right.
Compelling Byers to stop and leave his name and address was not incrimi-
nating, the plurality opined, because "disclosures with respect to automobile
accidents simply do not entail ... substantial risk of self-incrimination.
96
Nor was it testimonial, the plurality continued, because "[ilt merely provides
the State ... with the driver's identity,"97 and so compels "an essentially
neutral act."9 8 The Chief Justice did not deny that the driver's act of stop-
ping and disclosing his identity would give rise to the inference that the
driver believed he had been involved in an automobile accident, given that
the duty to stop was imposed only upon drivers of vehicles involved in acci-
dents. "In Wade, however," the plurality nevertheless concluded, "the
Court rejected the notion that such inferences are communicative or
testimonial." 99
As a matter of common sense, the conclusion would appear inescapable
that conduct compelled by the California statute was communicative or tes-
timonial. At a minimum, the statute compelled a driver to transmit or attest
to his or her name and address, a "neutral" communication perhaps, but still
a communication. Moreover, and as a practical matter, the driver's act of
furnishing his name and address in compliance with the statute communi-
cated the driver's involvement in an accident-inferential communication or
testimony perhaps, but again still communication or testimony. 00
In this Article, I have suggested that the testimonial requirement arose as
94. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
95. His conviction on the latter charge was reversed by the California Supreme Court on
the grounds that the self-reporting statute violated Byers' federal constitutional right against
compelled self-incrimination, and the state appealed. Id. at 426.
96. Id. at 431.
97. Id. at 433.
98. Id. at 432.
99. Id. at 433. Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment. In his view, compelling Byers
to stop and identify himself did involve the compulsion of incriminating testimony. Justice
Harlan nevertheless maintained that Byers' claim must fail because his fifth amendment inter-
est in refusing to comply with the statute was outweighed by the state's two-fold interest in
prosecuting traffic violations and establishing a system of personal financial responsibility for
automobile accidents. Id. at 452 (Harlan, J., concurring).




a simple means to the very limited end of placing physical evidence outside
the scope of the fifth amendment, thereby enabling the government to ex-
ploit the suspect as a source of physical evidence without running afoul of
the suspect's right against self-incrimination. Once one accepts the initial
premise that "to be a witness" within the meaning of the right is limited to
testifying or communicating, it is comparatively easy to accept that physical
evidence is not testimonial evidence, and that incriminating physical evi-
dence, therefore, may be compelled from the accused without transgressing
the fifth amendment.
In Byers, however, (and in Gilbert and Wade as well, at least as subse-
quently construed in Byers and Fisher), the testimonial requirement was ex-
panded in such a way as to exclude from fifth amendment protection not
only the evidence or information compelled (the driver's name and address),
but also the communicative inferences inherent in the driver's act of produc-
ing his name and address (that he had and took the opportunity to identify
himself at the scene of the accident as a participant in the accident). In so
expanding the testimonial requirement, the Court put itself in the difficult, if
not indefensible position of ruling that an act of producing evidence was
communicative but not communicative enough to be afforded fifth amend-
ment protection, while offering no guidance as to why the communication at
issue was not communicative enough or when a communication would meet
the fifth amendment testimonial requirement.
The question of whether the act of producing evidence or information is
testimonial enough to meet fifth amendment standards was addressed again
in Fisher v. United States. 101 In Fisher, the government sought to compel
production of a document in the possession of the suspect's attorney, that
had been prepared by the suspect's accountant. The document request was
resisted on fifth amendment grounds. The Supreme Court held that while
the attorney-client privilege entitled the suspect to refuse to permit his attor-
ney to disclose what the suspect would not be required to disclose himself,
the suspect had no fifth amendment right to refuse to produce the
document. 102
The Court reasoned that the document itself was unprotected by the fifth
amendment: while the document was unquestionably testimonial, and may
well have been incriminating, it had not been compelled, because it had been
drafted voluntarily by the suspect's agent.1°3 The Court acknowledged that
the act of producing the document possessed "communicative aspects of its
101. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
102. Id. at 409.
103. Id. at 409-10. In so holding, the Court overruled the longstanding precedent of Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the
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own," implicitly communicating the existence and authenticity of the docu-
ments produced. The Court nevertheless concluded, that in the context of
that case, the existence and authenticity of the documents sought were fore-
gone conclusions, that "the Government [was] in no way relying on 'the
truthtelling' of the taxpayer to prove the existence of or his access to the
documents" and, therefore, that the act of producing the document was
nontestimonial. 104
In Holt, Schmerber, Wade, Gilbert, and Byers, the Court had referred to
communications and testimony in the same breath, drawing no distinctions
between them as far as their eligibility for fifth amendment protection was
concerned. In Fisher, however, the Court silently jettisoned fifth amendment
protection for communications generally in favor of protection only for testi-
monial ("truthtelling") communications, and even then only if such commu-
nications are "sufficiently" testimonial.
In 1984, United States v. Doe1o5 was decided, in which the Court ad-
dressed the flip side of the issue confronted in Fisher and held that, where
the district court had made a specific finding that the existence and authen-
ticity of the document were not foregone conclusions, the act of producing
the document was sufficiently testimonial for fifth amendment purposes.1o6
In ruling that communications inferable from the act of producing a docu-
ment were sufficiently testimonial, the Court appears to have rejected the
plurality's intimation in Byers that testimonial inferences are not testimonial
enough to satisfy the requirement. After Doe, the unanswered question thus
remains: what determines when the act of producing evidence should be
"sufficiently testimonial" for the fifth amendment to apply?
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF FIFTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
A. A Summary of the Problem
The fundamental problem with the testimonial requirement as it has been
applied, is that the primary purpose it was intended to serve has been served
poorly. As previously discussed, the requirement arose as a means to enable
the government to obtain incriminating physical evidence from the suspect's
body without running afoul of the fifth amendment.17 Accepting as much,
however, in cases of compelled submission, the requirement is superfluous.
Subduing a suspect for the purpose of exploiting his body as a source of
Subpoena Duces Tecum: Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, 95 HARV. L. REv. 683 (1982);
see also supra note 83.
104. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411.
105. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
106. Id. at 613-14.
107. See supra notes 68-87 and accompanying text.
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physical evidence is unobjectionable because the suspect is not obliged to
incriminate himself; the suspect is incriminated, if at all, through the in-
dependent efforts of his accusers. The physical evidence obtained falls
outside the scope of the fifth amendment right without regard to the fact that
the evidence is nontestimonial.
Alternatively, in cases of compelled cooperation, the testimonial require-
ment would appear to be either ineffectual or arbitrary. The evidence a sus-
pect is compelled to assist in providing may be nontestimonial, but the act of
producing the evidence is testimonial, at least insofar as it compels the ac-
cused to attest to his ability to produce the physical evidence sought. If the
testimonial inferences inherent in the act of producing incriminating physi-
cal evidence are deemed to be testimonial for purposes of the fifth amend-
ment requirement, however, the concern is that the act of production could
not properly be compelled, and consequently that the physical evidence
sought could not be obtained-a result that would defeat the original pur-
pose of the testimonial requirement. The Court has avoided this problem by
ruling that the act of producing evidence may be testimonial, but not neces-
sarily enough so as to trigger fifth amendment protection and prevent the
government from gaining access to the underlying evidence in question. In
so holding, however, the Court's failure to offer any guidance as to what
distinguishes sufficiently testimonial acts from insufficiently testimonial acts
leaves the impression that its decisions on the question are purely arbitrary.
While furnishing no explicit clues, in distinguishing testimonial disclo-
sures from "sufficiently" testimonial disclosures, the Court appears to have
gone beyond an inquiry into whether there has been a testimonial communi-
cation, and focused upon the extent to which the testimony communicated is
damaging to the defendant. The act of providing exemplars is thus insuffi-
ciently testimonial because the testimony implicitly communicated is either
self-evident or truistic. Compelled disclosure of one's name and address at
the scene of an accident is nontestimonial because the testimony thereby
transmitted is "neutral" or "inferential." The act of producing a document
is likewise nontestimonial, insofar as the testimony transmitted provides the
government with no more than a "foregone conclusion."
Assessing whether a suspect has been compelled to testify in light of what
he has been compelled to testify serves only to muddy fifth amendment anal-
ysis. The issue of what a suspect may be compelled to attest to is addressed
by the incrimination requirement. Under that requirement, a suspect may
refuse to respond to a request from his accusers only if a direct answer would
furnish "evidence which may lead to criminal conviction," "information
which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence" leading to prosecution,
or "evidence which the individual reasonably believes could be used against
1987]
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him in a criminal prosecution."' °8 Testimonial communications that do not
put the suspect at risk of furnishing the prosecution with substantive infor-
mation or evidence are not incriminating within the meaning of the fifth
amendment. They are, nonetheless, testimonial communications.
A direct answer furnishing truisms, foregone conclusions, or neutral infor-
mation cannot reasonably be construed to put the suspect at risk of provid-
ing either evidence or substantive information, and thus is not incriminating.
In Doe, the Court clearly intimated as much in a footnote suggesting that the
act of producing a document would not be incriminating if the government
could successfully demonstrate that the existence and authenticity of the
document in question were "foregone conclusion[s]."' °9 To the extent that
the question of whether a given disclosure is testimonial is answered in terms
of whether the suspect has been compelled to substantiate information po-
tentially valuable to the prosecution, the testimonial requirement merely
duplicates the role of the incrimination requirement.
The confusion and error engendered by the failure of the Supreme Court
to segregate clearly the testimonial communication itself from the incrimi-
nating substance of the testimony communicated is illustrated by the deci-
sion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Prewitt. 110
Prewitt was arrested on suspicion of intentionally passing altered postal
money orders. He was photographed, fingerprinted, and asked whether he
used an alias. Prewitt responded that he was also known by the name of
Maji Mabarafu. Correspondence signed in the name of Maji Mabarafu was
108. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461 (1975) (emphasis added).
109. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. at 614 n.13 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 411 (1976)). Superficially, at least, the Court's remarks in Doe appear difficult to reconcile
with its holding in Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 81 (1965).
There, the government contended that because the SACB had already determined that Albert-
son was a communist, it would not aid the prosecution for Albertson to concede as much, and
such a concession would, therefore, not be incriminating. The Court rejected the government's
claim, with the explanation that:
"[T]he judgment as to whether a disclosure would be 'incriminatory' has never been
made dependent on an assessment of the information possessed by the Government
at the time of interrogation; the protection of the privilege would be seriously im-
paired if the right to invoke it was dependent on such an assessment, with all its
uncertainties."
Id.
A closer look reveals no fundamental inconsistency between Doe and Albertson. The Doe
Court recognized that when the government can demonstrate that a fact at risk of being dis-
closed is a foregone conclusion, the suspect cannot reasonably apprehend any danger from
disclosing such a fact. 465 U.S. at 610-12. In Albertson, the Court reaffirmed the long
respected proposition, unaffected by Doe, that the risk of incrimination must be assessed from
the perspective of the suspect, not the prosecution. 382 U.S. at 81.
110. 553 F.2d 1082 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 840 (1977).
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subsequently seized from Prewitt's home, reflecting the author's awareness
that the money orders had been altered."' Proceeding on the assumption
that the disclosure of the alias had been compelled because the suspect had
not contemporaneously received Miranda warnings, the court of appeals
concluded that compelling the disclosure was permissible because the sus-
pect's response was nontestimonial: "An alias is as much an identifying
characteristic as a defendant's voice or handwriting, and the Supreme Court
has held that the compelled production of voice or handwriting exemplars
does not violate the fifth amendment."
' 1 2
Contrary to the Seventh Circuit's conclusion, Prewitt's disclosure was tes-
timonial on two levels. First, the act of producing a response to the question
of whether the suspect used an alias testified to the suspect's ability to speak.
Second, the response itself substantiated that the suspect had an alias, and
what that alias was. While the former communication was not incriminat-
ing, the latter obviously was. In sum, the Prewitt court embarked upon the
questionable venture of assessing whether a compelled disclosure constituted
testimony in light of the substance of that testimony. Because the substance
of Prewitt's testimony pertained to an "identifying characteristic," the court
was led to the perverse conclusion that compelled and incriminating testi-
mony was nontestimonial, and therefore unobjectionable." 3
B. An Alternative Analytical Approach
A more sensible approach is to begin with the premise that a testimonial
communication is a transmission or communication of information that
tends to substantiate the existence or nonexistence of a fact or other matter.
Such a construction comports with the Fisher Court's observation that a tes-
timonial communication is one that implicitly calls upon the communicator
to tell the truth, i.e., to substantiate something." 4 Accepting this definition,
the first question is whether the government's request would compel the sus-
111. Prewitt, 553 F.2d at 1084-85.
112. Id. at 1086.
113. The court's ruling is premised upon a misunderstanding of Gilbert and Wade. In
those cases, the Supreme Court authorized the compelled disclosure of two identifying physi-
cal characteristics-voice and handwriting-because the disclosures did not require the sus-
pect to make any incriminating communications. It would have been a different case entirely,
if the police had confronted Gilbert with the bank robber's note, and asked him at gunpoint if
it was in his handwriting. In that case, he would have been compelled to testify against himself
in violation of his fifth amendment right, and it is difficult to imagine that the Court would
have held otherwise, notwithstanding that the question asked related to an identifying charac-
teristic. Similarly, Prewitt was asked whether he had an alias, and if so what that alias was.
His response was undeniably incriminating and testimonial; the fact that it concerned an iden-
tifying characteristic is irrelevant.
114. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976).
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pect to testify to anything. As a purely semantic matter, the existence of a
testimonial communication in any given instance is a yes or no proposition;
the phrase "not sufficiently testimonial," like not sufficiently unique, preg-
nant, or dead, is a nonsensical juxtaposition of terms. Compelled submis-
sion, on the one hand, is always nontestimonial. When a suspect is subdued
for the purpose of having his blood tested, as in Schmerber, or of having
clothes put on his body, as in Holt, he substantiates nothing. He merely sits
there while the police conduct a search of his body or prepare him for identi-
fication. Compelled assistance, on the other hand, is invariably testimonial.
The evidence or information a suspect is compelled to assist in providing
may itself be testimonial, as was the answer to the question of whether the
suspect had an alias in Prewitt, or the classic example of a compelled confes-
sion. Even if the evidence a suspect is compelled to produce is nontestimo-
nial, however, the act of producing that evidence will always be testimonial,
at least insofar as it obligates the suspect to substantiate that he is able to do
what he was told to do-write, speak, stand, walk, produce a document, etc.
Granted, a suspect's ability to walk, speak or produce a document may be
minimally informative, depending upon the circumstances of the case, but
that is a matter relevant only to whether the compelled testimony is incrimi-
nating. Whenever a suspect's compelled affirmative assistance is the subject
of a fifth amendment challenge, the testimonial requirement should be satis-
fied, at least with respect to the act of producing the information or evidence
sought, if not with regard to the evidence or information itself.
Assuming that the suspect is under compulsion to assist his accusers in
some fashion, and therefore compelled to testify to something, the next ques-
tion is whether the testimonial communication the suspect is compelled to
make is incriminating. It bears emphasizing that the testimonial communi-
cation itself must transmit incriminating knowledge or information before
the right will apply. The fact that a suspect is compelled to make an innocu-
ous communication incidental to the act of producing incriminating but un-
compelled or nontestimonial evidence, will render neither the evidence
produced nor the act of its production eligible for fifth amendment protec-
tion. 5 In such a case, the act of producing the evidence is testimonial and
115. In Doe, it will be recalled, the act of production would clearly have enabled the gov-
ernment to obtain the incriminating document produced. That fact, however, did not make
the act of producing the document incriminating. The testimonial communication compelled
must furnish incriminating information before the right will apply. In Doe, the testimony
compelled was that the document sought existed, and that the document produced was au-
thentic. If such information was a foregone conclusion, the act of production would not have
been incriminating; granted, the government would have obtained the incriminating document
but not as a result of any information the suspect was compelled to communicate through the
act of production. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 614 n.13 (1984).
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compelled, but not incriminating, while the evidence itself is incriminating,
but either uncompelled or nontestimonial. Whenever compelling the suspect
to produce evidence is the government's selected means of obtaining the evi-
dence produced, either the act of production or the evidence produced may
have been obtained in violation of the suspect's fifth amendment rights, but
the two must be evaluated separately.
In Fisher, for example, compelling a suspect, or in that case the suspect's
lawyer, to undertake the act of producing a document was the means em-
ployed by the government to achieve the end of obtaining that document.
The end sought-the document itself-was testimonial and incriminating,
but not compelled. The means, on the other hand-the act of producing the
document-was compelled. The ends and the means, however, could not be
combined to form a single fifth amendment violation. Because the informa-
tion substantiated by the act of producing the document was a foregone con-
clusion, the Court held that the act of production was not testimonial. More
accurately, the act of production was testimonial, but not incriminating. In
either case, however, the three prerequisites for a fifth amendment claim
were present in neither the document itself nor in the act of its production.
The suspect's fifth amendment claim was, therefore, properly rejected.
In Doe, as in Fisher, creation of the document itself had not been com-
pelled. However, the act of producing it was compelled, and attested to its
existence and authenticity, which in the context of that case were facts that
the suspect could reasonably apprehend as constituting information furnish-
ing a link in the evidentiary chain culminating in his conviction. The means
employed to obtain the document in Doe, thus amounted to a fifth amend-
ment violation.
The principal advantages of the proposed two-part analysis over the ap-
proach generally taken by the courts are greater consistency and clarity.
The exemplar cases provide a useful illustration. While the Gilbert Court
overlooked the issue entirely, the Court has since observed that the commu-
nication implicit in Gilbert's act of producing a writing sample (that he
could write) was not sufficiently testimonial for fifth amendment pur-
poses.'1 6 Suppose, however, that Gilbert's defense to the bank robbery
charge had been that he was illiterate and could not possibly have written
the note to the teller demanding money. Further suppose that the exemplar
was compelled in part for the purpose of establishing, contrary to Gilbert's
assertions, that he could write. Assuming that Gilbert's capacity to write
was not a truism or a foregone conclusion, the Court would appear con-
strained to conclude that the transmission implicit in the act of producing
116. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411.
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the exemplar (that Gilbert could write) was a testimonial communication for
fifth amendment purposes. 17
The problem is that the testimonial communication which Gilbert was
compelled to make in the original case and in the hypothetical variation, are
identical. The difference lies not in the extent to which there has been a
testimonial communication, but in the extent to which the communication is
incriminating. The standard for determining whether a given act will be
sufficiently testimonial is inherently amorphous and contradictory. In-
creased reliance upon the incrimination requirement is advisable if for no
other reason than its contours are comparatively well defined.
Applying the proposed two-part analysis to the Gilbert illustration, the
first question to be asked is whether the suspect has been compelled to com-
municate anything. With respect to the exemplar Gilbert produced, the an-
swer is no. The exemplar itself may have been compelled and incriminating,
but was only physical evidence, and communicated nothing from accused to
accuser. However, the means employed to obtain the exemplar-compelling
the act of writing certain words-constituted a transmission of information
substantiating the suspect's ability to write, and was therefore testimonial.
Moving on to the second question of whether Gilbert's compelled testimo-
nial communication was incriminating, the answer is again no, assuming
that the communication that Gilbert could write provided the government
with no more than a truism or a foregone conclusion. If Gilbert's ability to
write were obvious to all, he could not reasonably fear danger from such
disclosure. If, however, as in the hypothetical variation, the suspect's ability
to write is in fact an open question, compelling him to furnish an exemplar
would have violated his fifth amendment right.
A discussion of Byers has been reserved for last because it is superficially
117. In United States v. Campbell, 732 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1984), for example, the First
Circuit concluded that compelling a suspect to furnish a handwriting exemplar from dictation
for purposes of determining whether he could spell a word correctly, was testimonial and
incriminating. Id. at 1021. The object of the government's inquiry was not the physical form
of the suspect's handwriting, but rather substantiation of the extent of the suspect's proficiency
in English, i.e., a truthful communication as to the limits of his knowledge of the language,
which in the context of that case portended to be highly incriminating.
A contrary conclusion was reached by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Pheaster, 544
F.2d 353, 372 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977), on the grounds that spelling,
like handwriting, is a nontestimonial identifying characteristic. What the court neglected to
consider, is that obtaining the evidence sought-a distinctive misspelling of a particular
word--depended upon a truthful communication from the suspect that the way he spelled the
word for the police was the way he ordinarily spelled the word. If a suspect is made to sub-
stantiate whether he can write or spell, and if a direct answer may be incriminating, he has




more difficult to understand and explain in terms of the foregoing two-part
analysis, due largely to the context in which it arose. The California statute
compelled Byers to make two testimonial communications: the first was the
communication of his name and address, and the second, implicit in the act
of disclosing his name and address, was the communication that he was
identifying himself as required by the statute, in the belief that he had been
involved in an accident. The testimonial requirement, therefore, was un-
questionably satisfied and the plurality's decision should not have turned on
it, even in part. Rather, the exclusive issue should have been whether com-
pliance with the statute was incriminating.
As the Byers plurality noted, the communication of name and address is
"neutral" and not incriminating. 18 The communication implicit in the act
of furnishing name and address at the scene of the accident, however, would
have attested to Byers' presence at the scene and his involvement in the acci-
dent, thereby establishing his opportunity to commit the offense of causing
an accident by improper passing. At a minimum, the act of identifying him-
self at the scene of the accident would have furnished the police with an
investigatory lead that Byers could quite reasonably apprehend would
culminate in his prosecution.
The other cases discussed in this article arose in the context of conduct
compelled or sought to be compelled from a criminal suspect by means of a
direct command from police or prosecutor. To determine whether the con-
duct compelled is incriminating, the balance between the government's inter-
est in crime control and the suspect's interest in his fifth amendment rights is
struck by a rule entitling the suspect to refuse to respond if he reasonably
believes that his compliance will furnish the authorities with evidence or
information that could lead to his prosecution or conviction." 9 If this stan-
dard were applicable to Byers, the testimonial communication compelled
was undoubtedly incriminating.
Byers, however, arose in the context of conduct compelled by statute. In
determining whether such conduct is incriminating, the individual's interest
in his fifth amendment rights may be counterbalanced not only by the state's
interest in the control of crime, but by other noncriminal interests as well.
In such cases, the Court has struck a different balance. The resulting rule is
that compelled compliance with a preexisting statute will be incriminating
for fifth amendment purposes only if the statute is directed toward a
"'highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.' "120 In
118. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 432-34 (1971).
119. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
120. Byers, 402 U.S. at 429 (quoting Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd, 382
U.S. 70, 79 (1965)), relying on Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 47 (1968).
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the plurality's view, persons involved in automobile accidents do not consti-
tute such a group, and, therefore, compliance with the statute was not
deemed incriminating.
V. CONCLUSION
The testimonial component of the right against compelled self-incrimina-
tion is a simple device designed to achieve a practical result. It establishes
an artificial line enabling the government to obtain vital physical evidence,
while leaving undisturbed the suspect's right to refuse to cooperate with
more intrusive demands for incriminating testimonial communications.
The purpose of the testimonial requirement is best served by defining "tes-
timony" simply and narrowly as the transmission of information tending to
substantiate the existence or nonexistence of a fact or other matter. Defined
in this way, physical evidence is nontestimonial, as is compelled submission
to a police search for such evidence. While physical evidence itself is nontes-
timonial, if the defendant is compelled actively to assist his accusers in ac-
quiring physical evidence or other unprotected information, the act of
producing such evidence or information is invariably testimonial, inasmuch
as it compels the accused to disclose that he is capable or incapable of pro-
viding the assistance requested. The act of production will not be incrimi-
nating, however, unless the suspect's capacity to perform the task compelled
is a relevant and unresolved issue, because only then can the suspect reason-
ably apprehend danger from performing the task compelled.
This Article has proposed a straightforward two-part inquiry for resolu-
tion of cases presenting issues involving the testimonial component of the
right against compelled self-incrimination. One must first ask: Has the sus-
pect been compelled to make a testimonial communication, i.e., has he been
compelled to substantiate the existence or nonexistence of a fact or other
matter through a transmission of information? If so, then one asks second:
Is the fact or other matter the suspect has been compelled to substantiate
incriminating? By means of this simple analysis, applied in the manner sug-
gested in this Article, it is submitted that much of the confusion and error
engendered by the Supreme Court's decisions to date may be avoided.
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